STOP THE SPREAD:
HOW THE BUILD BACK BETTER ACT SEEKS TO REPLICATE WASHINGTON STATE’S UNION-DOMINATED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES MODEL NATIONWIDE

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Executive Summary

One of the most expensive elements of President Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” agenda, which congressional Democrats are seeking to pass unilaterally via the budget reconciliation process, is a vast expansion of Medicaid funding for home and community-based services (HCBS) that provide in-home care to, and prevent the institutionalization of, adults with functional disabilities. Such services are provided via state-designed-and-operated programs operating within federal parameters.

While the precise increase in funding in the Build Back Better Act (BBBA), H.R. 5376, has yet to be determined amid fast-moving negotiations in Congress, the proposals released so far all offer states hundreds of billions of dollars in additional federal funds to expand their HCBS programs.

The White House has claimed the additional spending is necessary to “permanently improve Medicaid coverage for home care services for seniors and people with disabilities... The framework will improve the quality of caregiving jobs, which will, in turn, help to improve the quality of care provided to beneficiaries.”

While additional funding for HCBS may or may not be justified, the federal funds come with conditions designed to steer potentially billions of dollars in Medicaid funds to unions representing home care aides, like the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).

As a condition of receiving the additional funding, states must implement changes to their HCBS programs designed to encourage the unionization of home care aides and are incentivized to use a historically disfavored model that would allow unions to force caregivers to pay dues as a condition of employment in states lacking right-to-work protections. Further, federal grant funds are made available to go directly to union-operated training programs for home care aides.

Certain congressional supporters of the BBBA have made it clear that boosting home care unions is a goal of the bill. In a recent op-ed, Rep. Robin Kelly (D-IL), brazenly argued that the BBBA would allow “organizations like SEIU” to “advocate” for home care workers.” SEIU endorsed Kelly in 2020 and contributed thousands of dollars to her campaign.

For its part, the SEIU has claimed the BBBA will mean, “Hundreds of thousands of union jobs for home care workers.”

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4 See Schedule B of the Forms 3X filed with the Federal Elections Commission by the SEIU Committee on Political Education in 2020. Available online at: https://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?202004209229541598
The structure of the legislation suggests that the architects of the BBBA look to replicate SEIU’s dominance of the home care system in Washington state nationwide, and union-sympathetic coverage of the BBBA’s HCBS provisions by prominent newspapers has repeatedly held up Washington state as an example to be emulated.6

In Washington, home care aides for Medicaid clients are unionized, with dues deducted from their Medicaid payments by the state. Additionally, the state requires robust training, of questionable utility, for caregivers and pays SEIU to provide it. Finally, the state uses Medicaid funds to pay trust funds affiliated with SEIU to provide health insurance, retirement and other benefits to caregivers. These entities face little meaningful accountability and typically operate with relatively high operating costs, often paying the union for administration. Overall, nearly three percent of the payroll expenses the state incurs on behalf of HCBS caregivers wind up in union coffers.

Expanding similar arrangements nationwide could potentially increase union revenue by billions of dollars, much of which, if history is any guide, will be spent by SEIU and AFSCME on furthering their wide-ranging political and electoral goals.

Given the degree to which they stand to benefit, it comes as no surprise that unions like SEIU are spending millions of dollars on advertisements and lobbying urging passage of the BBBA.7

If Congress believes additional HCBS funding is warranted, it should simply provide the funds to states with the flexibility to expand and improve such programs as they see fit. Structuring the program in such a way as to divert potentially billions of dollars in Medicaid funds to a politically influential special interest group with a track record of exploitative practices simply cannot be justified.

**Analysis of the Build Back Better Act’s Home Care Provisions**

The BBBA, H.R. 5376, contains a number of provisions aimed at increasing funding for Medicaid HCBS funding, encouraging state expansion of HCBS, and shaping the way in which states provide such services. Many of these provisions are specifically designed to promote the unionization of home care workers and steer Medicaid funds into union coffers.

However, the haste with which the legislation is being written and rewritten has made tracking the precise details difficult. An ostensibly $3.5 trillion draft of the BBBA was introduced on Sept. 27 and clocked in at 2,468 pages.8 However, on Oct. 28, the House Rules Committee released a smaller, purportedly less expensive version of the bill running 1,684 pages.9 This draft of the BBBA contained two generally similar, but not identical, versions of the same text pertaining to HCBS funding, one prepared by the Committee on Energy and Commerce10 and one prepared by the Committee on Ways and Means.11 The two committees’ language differed both from each other and from the original text of the BBBA, but no mechanism was provided to determine which is the “real” version.

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8 The text of H.R. 5376 is available online at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376


10 See Title III, Subtitle F.

11 See Title XIII, Subtitle E.
Still another draft was released by the Rules Committee on Nov. 3 totaling 2,135 pages. The following analysis is based on the latest version.

**TRAINING GRANTS**

Sec. 22302 of the BBBA appropriates $1 billion in grant funds to be allocated over 10 years to “eligible entities,” which include labor unions and affiliated funds, as well as state governments, Indian tribes and certain nonprofits. Grant funds must be used to develop and implement a strategy to recruit direct support workers, to retain direct support workers, and/or to develop or implement a paid training program for direct support workers focused on, among other things, workers’ rights under federal, state or local employment laws, including “forming, joining, or assisting a labor organization.” The training must also seek to help increase the “skills and competencies” of participating direct support workers with the goal of helping them attain “any associated recognized postsecondary credentials.”

In developing the grant proposal, applicants must “assure” HHS that they will “consult” with “direct support workers, their representatives [labor unions], and recipients of direct care services and their families.” (Emphasis added).

Grantees must also,

“...provide competitive wages, benefits, and other supportive services, including transportation, child care, dependent care, workplace accommodations, and workplace health and safety protections, to the direct support workers served by the grant that are necessary to enable such workers to participate in the activities supported by the grant.”

In short, grant funds can go directly to unions, and even non-union recipients may need to promote the unionization of direct support workers.

**HCBS IMPROVEMENT PLANNING GRANTS**

Sec. 30711 of the BBBA appropriates $130 million, “to remain available until expended,” for “HCBS improvement planning grants” to states.

States’ HCBS improvement plans must document the “existing Medicaid HCBS landscape” and include a description of how the state will increase the use of HCBS and ensure compensation for direct support workers is “sufficient” to support “recruitment and retention” and ensure “the availability of home and community-based services.”

In developing such plans, states must allow for,

“...a public notice and comment process that includes consultation with Medicaid eligible individuals who are recipients of home and community-based services, family caregivers of such recipients, providers, health plans, direct care workers, chosen representatives of direct care workers [labor unions], and aging, disability, and workforce advocates.”

(Emphasis added).

States must implement their HCBS improvement plan if it is approved by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

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ADDITIONAL FEDERAL FUNDING FOR HCBS IMPROVEMENT STATES

If a state’s HCBS improvement plan is approved by HHS and the state remains in compliance with various requirements, Sec. 30712 provides that the state becomes eligible for a six-point increase in its federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), or the share of the state’s Medicaid expenditures covered by federal funds.13

To receive the added federal funds, states must “update qualification standards” and provide “training opportunities” for HCBS caregivers.

States must also “…update and, as appropriate, increase payment rates” for HCBS services to “support recruitment and retention of the direct care workforce” by completing, “at least every 3 years,” a “transparent process involving meaningful input from nongovernmental stakeholders.” The process is designed to increase wages to direct support workers in a manner bearing a striking — and likely not coincidental — resemblance to collective bargaining.

PROMOTION OF THE AGENCY WITH CHOICE MODEL

Sec. 30712 further provides that HCBS improvement states may receive an additional, one-and-a-half-year, two-point increase in their FMAP (for a cumulative eight-point increase) if they establish, on their own or via contracting with one or more “entities,” an “agency with choice or a similar service delivery model” to perform the functions of, among other things:

- “Registering qualified direct care workers and assisting beneficiaries in finding direct care workers”;
- “Undertaking activities to recruit and train independent providers to enable beneficiaries to direct their own care, including by providing or coordinating training for beneficiaries on self-directed care”;  
- “Ensuring the safety of, and supporting the quality of, care provided to beneficiaries”;
- “Supporting beneficiary hiring, if selected by the beneficiary, of independent providers of home and community-based services, including by processing applicable tax information, collecting and processing timesheets, submitting claims and processing payments to such providers”; and,
- Ensuring such programs do not “promote or prevent the ability of workers to form a labor organization or discriminate against workers who may join or decline to join such an organization.”

The agency with choice model is one method by which states have historically been permitted to structure HCBS delivery. It is also the model unions representing home care workers have come to prefer as it provides the legal structure needed to require caregivers to pay union dues as a condition of employment.

Medicaid does not generally pay beneficiaries directly, but rather reimburses providers for services rendered to beneficiaries. At the same time, a consensus has developed in recent decades regarding the importance and benefits of maximizing beneficiaries’ ability to self-direct their care. To accommodate these two realities,

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https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/matching-rates/ 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/federal-medical-assistance-percentages-or-federal-financial-participation-state-assistance
Medicaid provides for financial management services (FMS) entities (sometimes also referred to as fiscal intermediaries) to pay self-directing program participants’ workers... States may arrange for FMS through a ‘fiscal/employer agent’ (F/EA) in which the FMS is strictly a payroll agent and self-directing program participants are their workers’ sole legal employers under tax law. Alternatively, states may arrange for FMS via an ‘Agency with Choice’ (AwC). Although, for tax purposes, the AwC is the sole legal employer of self-directing program participants’ workers; AwCs do not assume all of the other employer responsibilities of a typical home care agency.”

While both methods are permissible, HHS during both the Obama and Trump administrations promoted the fiscal/employer agent model over agency with choice, as the former best permits clients to take charge of and direct their own care.

In 2010, HHS explained that, “Fiscal/Employer Agents are most effective for implementing participant direction programs” because:

“First, using an F/EA provides participants a high degree of choice and control over their workers as their common law employers, while reducing their employer-related burden by managing the payroll and bill payment tasks. Second, using an F/EA provides safeguards for participants by ensuring that all required taxes are paid and all Department of Labor and workers compensation insurance requirements are met. Third, using an F/EA can provide fiscal accountability for states.”

In 2016, the Center for Medicaid Services (CMS) within HHS released an informational bulletin to states in which it explained;

“There are generally two models of PCS [personal care] service delivery that states can choose to make available: agency-directed or self-directed. Agency-directed is the traditional delivery model for PCS. Under this approach, a qualified PCS agency hires, fires, pays and trains PCAs to provide services to eligible individuals. A variation of the agency model is the agency with choice*, in which an agency is co-employer with the beneficiary of PCS attendants. Self-directed PCS is an alternative to the traditional delivery model. Under self-directed models, beneficiaries or their representatives have decision-making authority over PCS and take direct responsibility to manage their services with the assistance of a system of available supports... Beneficiary decision-making and autonomy are hallmarks of self-directed models of service provision, and CMS strongly encourages use of self-directed models with necessary supports using a person-centered planning process.”

(Emphasis added).

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And in 2019, a CMS guidance document stated that, “The Fiscal/Employer Agent model provides Medicaid program participants with the greatest level of flexibility and empowerment” and observed that, “Many states... use this model to allow Medicaid program participants and their families to self-direct.”

**CIRCUMVENTING THE SUPREME COURT**

Most likely, the BBBA incentivizes states to adopt an agency with choice model not because it is best for clients, but because unions believe this structure provides them with the legal authority necessary to compel home care aides to pay union dues as a condition of employment.

In June 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Harris v. Quinn* that the First Amendment does not permit states and unions to compel “quasi-public employees,” like the Illinois personal assistants for Medicaid clients who brought the lawsuit, to pay union dues or fees as a condition of employment.

Ever since unions began organizing home care workers in California in the early 1990s, the challenge has been to establish a common employer against which to bargain. In self-directed HCBS programs, individual workers contract with the state or a fiscal/employer agent to serve individual clients, who are the employers of record, making traditional unionization under the National Labor Relations Act effectively impossible.

Rather than attempt to get Congress to amend the NLRA, however, unions turned to the states, which have the authority to permit or regulate the unionization of public employees via state collective bargaining laws. To solve the problem of no common employer, unions lobbied state officials to declare home care workers public employees solely for the purpose of placing them under the state’s collective bargaining laws for government workers and to designate a single government agency or official as their putative “employer.” As these state laws generally allowed unions to force public employees, such as teachers, to pay union dues/fees as a condition of employment, caregivers found themselves in the same position. This was the approach adopted in Illinois and, to varying degrees and for various times, at least 14 other states.

In *Harris*, however, the Supreme Court recognized that these unions typically provided minimal representational benefits to caregivers while spending the collected dues on political advocacy. Consequently, the Supreme Court struck down the forced payment “scheme” as compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.

As a result of the ruling, unions could no longer collect dues from the tens of thousands of unionized home care aides who never signed up for or resigned their union membership.

Upset with the loss in revenue, SEIU 775 — which represents the 45,000 individual provider home care aides (IPs) serving Medicaid clients in Washington state — concocted a scheme to reimpose mandatory dues.

As far back as June 2014, SEIU 775 had asked Gov. Jay Inslee to help the union respond to the anticipated loss in *Harris* by “contract[ing] with an outside entity to run the home care system, making IPs private-

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sector employees.” However, this change required legislative action and the union lacked the political support in Olympia to implement it until after Democrats recaptured the state Senate majority via a 2017 special election.

In 2018, at the urging of SEIU 775, the Washington State Legislature passed and Gov. Inslee signed SB 6199, directing the state to contract with a “consumer directed employer” (CDE) to manage the workforce of home care aides serving Medicaid clients.

Regulations subsequently adopted by the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) define the CDE as:

“...a private entity that contracts with the department to be the legal employer of individual providers for purposes of performing administrative functions. The consumer directed employer is patterned after the agency with choice model, recognized by the federal centers for medicare and medicaid services for financial management in consumer directed programs.”

(Emphasis added).

As an agency with choice, the CDE will:

“...[operate] under a co-employment arrangement whereby employer status is shared by the participant and an agency. For IRS purposes and other considerations, the agency is the primary or legal employer and officially hires the worker(s), processes human resource forms, and manages the payroll tasks. They also monitor the participant’s health and welfare, ensure that intended services are provided, and may provide guidance on recruiting, training, managing, and discharging workers. The participant or his/her representative is the secondary or managing employer. In this role, the participant or representative recruits, interviews, and selects workers, and then refers them to an agency for the completion of employment/payroll paperwork. In addition, the participant or representative trains, manages, and discharges workers (to the extent they wish to).”

Union and state officials made no secret of their reasoning for the change. As “employees” of a private company in a state without right-to-work protections, caregivers could again be forced to pay 3.2 percent of their paychecks to SEIU 775 as a condition of caring for, in most cases, loved ones and close friends.

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22 The Washington State Legislature’s official bill page for SB 6199, including text and history, is available online at: https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=6199&Year=2017&Initiative=false
23 See WAC 388-115-0503.
The secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) acknowledged to legislators that contracting with a CDE/agency with choice would allow the union to reimpose “a closed shop” in which dues payment is mandatory.26

When asked by *The Seattle Times* whether SB 6199 was about requiring caregivers to support his union, SEIU 775’s president simply replied, “Anything that allows for stronger unions... is obviously good in and of itself.”27 The union’s secretary-treasurer made similar comments in an interview with *The News Tribune*:

“...[Adam] Glickman said the possibility of a union in which workers can’t opt out of collective bargaining costs without religious objection would be ‘a good thing’ that would make SEIU a ‘stronger union.’ Glickman said sidestepping a Supreme Court decision, within legal bounds, to reach that goal is not unethical as some Republicans have claimed. ‘I don’t think there’s anything wrong with states legislating their values even if those values conflict with Supreme Court decisions,’ he said.”28

The state has since hired a vendor to serve as the CDE/agency with choice and is in the early stages of transitioning caregivers over to the new vendor. According to DSHS, the first pilot group of about 200 caregivers began logging hours for the vendor on October 1, 2021. About 16,000 more will transition over on Feb. 1, 2022, and the remaining 30,000 will transition on April 1, 2022.29 By the summer, caregivers will likely find themselves back where they were before *Harris*, with nearly $1,000 per year being diverted from their paychecks to SEIU 775 and nothing they can do about it.30

Nationally, unions and allied organizations have not publicly endorsed the agency with choice model as a workaround to *Harris*. But they’ve definitely hinted at attaching federal funds to Medicaid dollars to promote unionization of home care workers.

Earlier this year, the SEIU-supported31 Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (PHI) wrote that Washington’s decision to contract with a single CDE/agency with choice “could serve as a model for other states to replicate in their own consumer-directed programs.”32

In the context of the BBBA specifically, *Bloomberg Law* reported in May that, according to congressional sources, SEIU was pressing for the legislation to promote the creation of “new entities [that would] assume the role of employers,” thus allowing for the unionization of caregivers as employees. Unsurprisingly, the SEIU itself refused to comment.33

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And for years, labor groups have called for, “Policies that attach quality workplace requirements to public funds,” such as requiring states to “create a central decision-making body with whom workers can collectively bargain over wages and job standards” as a condition of receiving federal Medicaid funds.\(^{34}\) Washington’s experience, combined with the fact that the BBBA is using the promise of federal funding to incentivize states to adopt an agency with choice model — which HHS has not historically recommended — strongly suggests the goal is to deprive caregivers of their constitutional right to refrain from union dues payments on a technicality.

**THE SEIU MODEL IN WASHINGTON STATE**

The BBBA’s endorsement of the agency with choice model is just one of the many ways the legislation seeks to transform the nation’s HCBS into Washington’s likeness. Since 2001, SEIU has dominated and shaped the state’s home care system, ensuring that a healthy portion of the Medicaid funds intended for client care end up in the union’s treasury, where they are used to subsidize the union’s wide-ranging political agenda.

While large and increasing amounts of Medicaid funds are expended on HCBS in Washington state, many of the union-operated training and employee benefits programs — the kind the BBBA seeks to expand around the country — suffer from a lack of accountability, high administrative costs, and apparent cronyism, and fail to produce the intended results.

**TRAINING**

In 2011, Washington voters approved Initiative 1163,\(^ {35}\) a union-backed ballot measure that created the most robust training requirements for home care aides in the country, with most providers required to obtain and maintain a home care aide certificate by completing 75 hours of initial training and 12 hours of annual continuing education.\(^ {36}\) Washington state’s experience with mandated training requirements for home care workers serving Medicaid clients has produced, at best, mixed results.

As a result of the initiative, all training for IPs must be provided by a single “training partnership” selected by the IPs’ union, SEIU 775.\(^ {37}\) Unsurprisingly, the entity selected by SEIU 775 — the SEIU Healthcare NW Training Partnership (TP) — was one that it created and that it claims is now the largest such training operation for home caregivers in the country.

Under Article 15.4 of the 2021-23 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) currently in effect between the state of Washington and SEIU 775, the state pays $0.435 for every hour worked by an IP to the TP.\(^ {38}\) The Partnership reported total revenue of $42.3 million on its tax return for FY 2020, and its executive director was paid $245,379.\(^ {39}\) SEIU 775 and the Training Partnership share officers, office space and a call center.

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\(^{37}\) RCW 74.39A.360.

\(^{38}\) Article 15 of the 2021-23 collective bargaining agreement currently in effect between the State of Washington and SEIU Local 775. Available online at: https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/labor/agreements/21-23/nse_homecare.pdf

\(^{39}\) The most recent Form 990 filed by the Training Partnership with the Internal Revenue Service is available online at: https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/510673005_202006_990_2021052618210524.pdf
And the state’s financial obligation towards the Training Partnership has proven lucrative for SEIU 775 as well. In FY 2020, the TP paid $3.4 million — 8.1 percent of its total revenue that year — to SEIU 775.\textsuperscript{40}

Further, the TP consistently collects more in revenue than it expends on training, leading to steadily increasing net assets and cash holdings. From FY 2012 to 2020, the TP’s expenses increased by 352 percent, while its net assets increased by 668 percent. The TP also pays steadily increasing amounts to SEIU 775, totaling $17.8 million from 2013-20.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Net Assets</th>
<th>Paid to SEIU 775</th>
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**Total** | **$223,088,237** | **$207,753,221** | **$76,948,969** | **$17,787,759**

*Source: Form 990 tax returns submitted by the TP to the IRS.*

The state’s statutorily required financial obligation to the TP as the monopoly provider of mandated training to IPs has, predictably, limited providers’ choices, resulted in poor customer service, and has made it difficult for some rural providers to access required training. After all, the TP’s revenue is completely untethered from its performance.

And alternatives are available. In fact, more than 50 other entities are certified by DSHS to offer the same 75-hour, long-term care training provided by the TP — they just can’t serve the IPs SEIU 775 represents. Most would also likely be ineligible to receive training grant funds under Sec. 22302 of the BBBA.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite the hundreds of millions of Medicaid dollars paid to the TP since passage of I-1163 in 2011, recruitment and retention challenges continue to plague the state, and a series of audits conducted by the Washington State Auditor suggests the stringent training requirements bear at least some of the blame.

A 2014 audit found that, despite efforts in prior years to improve the completion rate, only one-third of persons seeking a home care aide certificate completed the training and were certified within required deadlines. The auditor noted that, “Program managers told us they believe that the failure of workers to complete the certification has resulted in a higher turnover rate, which can affect continuity of care for clients.”\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.


The audit further reported that,

“Program managers recognize that both completion rates and timeliness need to be improved, but point out that some factors are outside their control. For example, some people caring for a family member might decide not to pursue the 75 hours of required training needed to gain the certificate. Agency officials suggested that some workers leave the home care aide certificate program to pursue other types of certifications. For example, becoming a certified nursing assistant requires about 10 additional training hours but may lead to greater employment opportunities. Some people simply change their minds about working in the field, and others fail background checks. All these reasons affect home care aide certificate completion rates.”

In other words, the training requirements themselves were problematic.

A subsequent audit in 2016 found that the home care aide “certification completion rates have remained flat” despite efforts to increase passage, including lowering exam passing scores. Of course, the TP gets paid the same regardless of the success or failure of its trainees in passing the state home care aide certification exam, and may even benefit from being paid to train students a second time who were unable to earn their certificate the first time.

Finally, the most recent state audit from 2019 examined reducing training requirements for certain caregivers as a way to boost recruitment:

- “Broad demographic trends and various studies suggest a growing need for long-term care, though it is difficult to quantify. Those trends and studies also suggest there will be an insufficient number of caregivers to meet that need.”
- “The expected shortages in long-term care workers mean that families of people with disabilities, including those who are eligible for Medicaid, will likely face challenges in finding qualified caregivers. One possible way to address future unmet need is to expand training and certification exemptions beyond those currently afforded to parents and adult children.”
- “By reducing the training requirements and offering the flexibility of online training, extended family members may be more inclined to become individual providers and be paid for their services.”

Overall, however, the auditor’s report concluded without making any formal recommendations given the lack of hard data about the effectiveness of the training.

Despite repeated studies by the auditor, no empirical evidence to date suggests Washington state’s training requirements have measurably improved client care. Instead, the primary purpose of the training, in addition to serving as another revenue source for SEIU 775 via the TP, appears to be allowing the union to argue for higher wages and benefits at the bargaining table on the unproven assumption that time spent in a TP classroom increases the value of caregivers’ labor.

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43 Ibid.
HEALTH INSURANCE

Pursuant to Article 9.2 of the current CBA between SEIU 775 and the State of Washington, the state pays $3.79 for every hour worked by an IP to the SEIU Healthcare NW Health Benefits Trust (HBT) for the purposes of offering health insurance benefits to certain IPs.\(^{46}\)

Though paid for by Medicaid, eligibility for benefits and benefit amounts are both determined by the HBT. To qualify for benefits at present, an IP must work at least 80 hours per month and pay a nominal premium of $25 per month.\(^{47}\)

As part of the SEIU 775 constellation, housed in the union’s downtown Seattle office, the HBT pays both the TP and SEIU 775 for various administrative services. From FY 2010-19, the HBT paid nearly $24.5 million to the TP and a further $2.4 million to the union.

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<th>Paid to SEIU 775</th>
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<td>FY 2014</td>
<td>$149,889,337</td>
<td>$145,671,055</td>
<td>$4,072,234</td>
<td>$1,565,043</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>$149,743,289</td>
<td>$26,468,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2013</td>
<td>$125,875,145</td>
<td>$129,225,279</td>
<td>$2,722,813</td>
<td>$595,073</td>
<td>$265,576</td>
<td>$131,948,092</td>
<td>$26,322,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2012</td>
<td>$124,576,251</td>
<td>$116,158,847</td>
<td>$2,358,374</td>
<td>$413,886</td>
<td>$355,999</td>
<td>$118,517,221</td>
<td>$32,394,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2011</td>
<td>$113,703,712</td>
<td>$103,572,725</td>
<td>$1,972,905</td>
<td>$233,802</td>
<td>$343,533</td>
<td>$105,545,630</td>
<td>$9,881,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2010</td>
<td>$102,781,675</td>
<td>$105,398,688</td>
<td>$1,391,848</td>
<td>$33,693</td>
<td>$80,453</td>
<td>$106,790,536</td>
<td>$1,723,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1,676,842,853</td>
<td>$1,369,659,137</td>
<td>$92,190,329</td>
<td>$24,466,714</td>
<td>$2,387,792</td>
<td>$1,461,849,466</td>
<td>$809,037,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Form 990 tax returns submitted by the HBT to the IRS.

Like the TP, the HBT pays high, and rapidly growing, amounts towards administrative expenses. Since FY 2010, the HBT's revenue has increased 250 percent, but benefits paid have increased by only 176 percent. Meanwhile, the HBT's administrative expenses have increased by 1,842 percent and its net assets by 14,000 percent. In FY 2019, only 71.2 percent of the HBT's revenue went towards paying out benefits to IPs.\(^{48}\)

Part of the HBT’s asset accumulation can be explained by its transition from a fully insured plan to a self-funded plan in August of 2016. Instead of paying premiums, as a self-funded plan, the HBT needs enough reserves to manage unexpectedly high claims. An employee benefits consultant for the HBT testified before the Washington State Legislature in 2017 that self-funded plans are recommended to have at least

\(^{46}\) See Article 9 of the 2021-23 collective bargaining agreement currently in effect between the State of Washington and SEIU Local 775. Available online at: https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/labor/agreements/21-23/nse_homecare.pdf


\(^{48}\) The most recent Form 990 tax return submitted by the SEIU Healthcare NW Health Benefits Trust to the IRS is available online at: https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/201842198_201906_9900_2020100817359412.pdf
16 weeks of reserves available.⁴⁹ As of June 2019, the HBT had cash and investment assets sufficient to cover nearly 67 weeks of benefits.⁵⁰

This should come as no surprise, given the HBT’s structure. In the private-sector, employers have financial incentives to limit health insurance costs. There is no such dynamic with the HBT. As currently structured, SEIU is able to determine (1) through bargaining, the amount that a third-party, the state, will pay for IPs’ health benefits, (2) worker eligibility for health benefits, and (3) the amount to spend on benefits. This structure creates incentives to overcharge and under-deliver for benefits, and to steer funds towards SEIU affiliates. Finally, the HBT has never been — and, as an ERISA-governed trust, probably cannot be — audited by the state, and the lack of public disclosure or financial transparency requirements from the HBT further decreases its accountability.

**RETIREMENT**

As required by Article 21.2 of the CBA between SEIU 775 and the State of Washington, the state pays the SEIU 775 Secure Retirement Trust (SRT) $0.80 for every hour an IP works in order to provide retirement benefits for eligible IPs.

As with the HBT, the SRT unilaterally determines benefit eligibility requirements, vesting standards and benefit amounts. Also like the HBT, it faces minimal financial transparency obligations and lacks any incentives to control costs or maximize benefits for IPs, leaving it largely unaccountable. The SRT is a relatively new benefit though, like the other funds operated by SEIU 775, it has begun finding ways to pay the union for various services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Benefits paid</th>
<th>Admin. Expenses</th>
<th>Paid to SEIU 775</th>
<th>Total expenses</th>
<th>Net Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2020</td>
<td>$44,644,639</td>
<td>$533,393</td>
<td>$4,148,825</td>
<td>$28,457</td>
<td>$4,682,218</td>
<td>$110,883,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2019</td>
<td>$27,179,610</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$3,529,176</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$3,529,176</td>
<td>$59,039,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>$16,030,748</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2,246,448</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$2,246,448</td>
<td>$35,389,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>$21,861,841</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$256,895</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$256,895</td>
<td>$21,604,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$109,716,838</td>
<td>$533,393</td>
<td>$10,181,344</td>
<td>$28,457</td>
<td>$10,714,737</td>
<td>$226,917,695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Form 5500 annual returns submitted by the TP to the U.S. Dept. of Labor

Despite collecting nearly $110 million in the first years of its existence, the SRT has paid only 0.5 percent of this in benefits to IPs.⁵¹ Though the SRT’s net assets are growing rapidly, it has spent 19 times as much on administrative expenses as it has on benefits to IPs.

The experience of the SRT suggests that, at least in the early years, states that use additional federal Medicaid funds to stand up new benefit programs for home care aides may find themselves spending most of the money on administrative costs, with little to no benefit provided to caregivers.

⁴⁹ Galen Li. Testimony before the Washington State Senate Ways and Means Committee, February 14, 2017. [https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2017021247&startStreamAt=6088&stopStreamAt=6172&autoStartStream=true](https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2017021247&startStreamAt=6088&stopStreamAt=6172&autoStartStream=true)

⁵⁰ According to Part X of the HBT’s most recent Form 990 tax return filed with the IRS for the period ending June 30, 2019, the HBT had $808,772 in non-interest-bearing cash, $34,504,959 in savings, and $202,775,264 invested in publicly traded securities, for a total of $238,088,995, or 128 percent of the $185,625,028 in benefits the HBT paid out during the 52 weeks FY 2019. 52 weeks multiplied by 128 percent equals 67 weeks.

⁵¹ See the most recent Form 5500 annual return submitted by the SEIU 775 Secure Retirement Trust to the U.S. Department of Labor. Available online at: [https://efast2-filings-public.s3.amazonaws.com/prd/2021/04/14/20210414220900NAL0008190289002.pdf](https://efast2-filings-public.s3.amazonaws.com/prd/2021/04/14/20210414220900NAL0008190289002.pdf)
**Referral Registry**

The newest benefit for IPs to be included in the CBA between SEIU 775 and the state of Washington funds a duplicative, third-party referral registry. Article 14.5 of the CBA obligates the state to contribute $0.03 for every hour worked by an IP to “a third-party vendor jointly selected by the State and the Union” for the purposes of offering “an online and telephone based registry referral service” to connect IPs seeking work with Medicaid clients seeking caregivers.\(^\text{52}\)

Unsurprisingly, the selected vendor — Carina\(^\text{53}\) — was created and is managed by SEIU 775. Its executive director received $222,490 in compensation in FY 2019.\(^\text{54}\)

As a newer and less expensive benefit than training or health insurance, Carina has yet to collect the eye-popping revenue of other SEIU 775-operated trust funds.

Nevertheless, the fact that the state agreed to pay for Carina’s creation and management is noteworthy if only because DSHS already operated, and continues to operate, its own taxpayer-funded referral registry.\(^\text{55}\)

As another example of how Medicaid-funded and union-selected/affiliated benefit trusts face no accountability for performance, the state and union have faced (and dismissed) an IPs’ grievance pointing out that Carina has yet to offer any “telephone based” referral services, despite the obligatory language to that effect in the CBA.\(^\text{56}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carina Revenue and Expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Form 990 tax returns submitted by Carina to the IRS.

**The BBBA’s Financial Benefit to Unions**

While it is impossible to measure the extent to which the BBBA, if adopted, would steer Medicaid funds into union treasuries, it could amount to hundreds of millions — if not billions — of dollars.

The exact cost of the HCBS components of the BBBA is not presently known. Press reports commonly suggested the original version of the bill would direct $400 billion to HCBS, as President Biden called for in March 2021 as part of his “American Jobs Plan.”\(^\text{57}\) However, a more recent September analysis by the union-aligned Economic Policy Institute estimated the original bill would have directed $344 billion to “long term care.”\(^\text{58}\)

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\(^{52}\) See Article 14 of the 2021-23 collective bargaining agreement currently in effect between the State of Washington and SEIU Local 775. Available online at: https://ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/labor/agreements/21-23/nse_homecare.pdf

\(^{53}\) See https://www.carinacare.com/

\(^{54}\) The most recent Form 990 filed by Carina with the Internal Revenue Service is available online at: https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/320530631_201906_990_2021012117625095.pdf

\(^{55}\) See http://www.hcrw.wa.gov/


While the Congressional Budget Office has yet to complete its analysis of the most recent version of the bill, congressional Democrats estimate it will add $150 billion in HCBS funding.  

The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates Medicaid spent $114 billion on HCBS in FY 2021 and that, if another $400 billion was evenly spent over the next 10 years, it would amount to “at least” a 33 percent/$40 billion annual increase over the baseline, and “even more if state spending also increases.”

A Freedom Foundation research paper documented that, in 2017, unions like SEIU and AFSCME collected $147 million in dues deducted from Medicaid payments to 358,000 home care aides in eight states, including Washington, Oregon, California, Minnesota, Illinois, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont. That amount has almost certainly increased since. In California, for instance — home to the bulk of currently unionized caregivers nationwide — the two unions representing caregivers in the state’s In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program saw their dues revenue cumulatively increase 11 percent, from $104.6 million in 2017 to $115.6 million in 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Dues</th>
<th>Total members</th>
<th>IHSS Members</th>
<th>Average member dues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$78,814,307</td>
<td>192,376</td>
<td>179,729</td>
<td>$409.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$89,089,900</td>
<td>188,778</td>
<td>180,048</td>
<td>$471.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Dues</th>
<th>Total members</th>
<th>IHSS Members</th>
<th>Average member dues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$25,780,529</td>
<td>81,448</td>
<td>81,050</td>
<td>$316.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$26,554,910</td>
<td>72,149</td>
<td>72,149</td>
<td>$368.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Dues</th>
<th>Total members</th>
<th>IHSS Members</th>
<th>Average member dues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$104,594,836</td>
<td>273,824</td>
<td>260,779</td>
<td>$381.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>$115,644,810</td>
<td>260,927</td>
<td>252,197</td>
<td>$443.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assuming the same held true for other unions, current baseline practices resulted in unions collecting about $163 million in 2020.

If all else remained equal, simply increasing HCBS funding by 33 percent annually over 10 years, as the Sept. 27 version of the BBBA would do, would presumably increase union dues revenue in the states in which caregivers for Medicaid clients are already unionized by an equivalent amount, translating to an extra $54 million in dues annually for unions, or $540 million over 10 years.

Adding $150 billion in HCBS funding over 10 years, as the current version of the BBBA proposes to do, would represent roughly a 13 percent annual increase in funding, translating to an additional $21 million in dues revenue per year, or $212 million over 10 years.

However, the BBBA is engineered specifically to increase the unionization of home caregivers, though the extent to which it would do so is impossible to predict.

If states without right-to-work protections for private-sector employees in which home care aides are currently unionized and working under a fiscal/employer agent model switch to an agency with choice model in the same way Washington did, hundreds of thousands of caregivers could be forced to pay union dues.

For instance, in Washington state, 26 percent of Medicaid-paid IPs — almost 12,200 caregivers — were not paying dues as of July 2021. On average, SEIU 775 members pay about $920 in dues per year, so again requiring all IPs to pay dues as a condition of employment next year, via the transition to the agency with choice model, should increase the union’s annual revenue by about $11.2 million.

The boost to unions from mandated dues payment would be even more dramatic in states like California, where only half of IHSS providers are currently union members. The California Department of Social Services reports there are about 520,000 caregivers in the IHSS program, but between them, SEIU 2015 and UDW claim only 261,000 members. Forcing the other 259,000 to pay union dues would increase the unions’ annual revenue by about $115 million.

Combined, mandating union membership for HCBS caregivers in Washington and California alone — where about 80 percent of currently unionized HCBS caregivers work — would increase union dues collection by at least $1.26 billion over 10 years. Factor in 13 percent more Medicaid spending on HCBS services — meaning more and/or better compensated caregivers — and this amount rises to $1.42 billion.

Further, HCBS caregivers in some or all of the other 42 states will likely end up being unionized because of the BBBA’s promotion of union membership, generating still more, but indeterminate, dues revenue for unions, though the right-to-work laws presently on the books in 27 of these states would at least prevent caregivers from being forced to pay dues even under an agency with choice model.

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64 According to payroll data obtained by the author from the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services via a request submitted via Chapter 42.56 RCW, the Public Records Act.


66 Schedule 13 of SEIU 2015’s LM-2 Form for 2020 indicates the union had 180,048 public homecare worker members. The LM-2 is available online at: https://olmsapps.dol.gov/query/orgReport.do?rptId=750539&rptForm=LM2Form

Schedule 13 of UDW’s LM-2 Form for 2020 indicates the union had 72,149 members that year.

Lastly, unions will almost certainly be funneled additional, non-dues revenue through employer-funded and union-administered benefits trusts and collect additional deductions from HCBS caregivers’ Medicaid payments as political contributions.

At the high end of the spectrum, consider what would happen if every state HCBS model ended up looking like Washington’s as a result of the BBBA, complete with unionization under an agency with choice model and an array of union-operated training programs and benefits trusts.

At present, every hour an IP works costs the state of Washington between $21.91 and $24.71. Between dues deducted from IPs’ wages and payments by union-affiliated trusts to the union itself, about 2.7 percent of these hourly rates find their way to SEIU 775.

If (1) the BBBA increases annual HCBS spending from $114 billion to $123 billion, (2) 75 percent of HCBS funds go towards caregiver payroll and benefits, and (3) Washington state’s model spreads nationwide, meaning 2.7 percent of all HCBS worker payroll and benefits payments went to unions, it would amount to annual revenue for unions of $2.5 billion, or $25 billion over 10 years.

Reducing this amount by about 25 percent based on (1) the fact that half the nation’s population lives in right-to-work states and cannot be required to pay union dues and (2) the assumption that only about half of unionized caregivers in such states would join a union, puts the annual revenue for unions from HCBS funds at about $1.9 billion, or $18.8 billion over 10 years, under the BBBA.

Of course, states will diverge in their approaches, with some being more union-friendly than others, caregivers in some states may opt not to unionize at all, and the exact amount of additional funding for HCBS under the BBBA has yet to be determined.

Whatever the exact amount, it is clear that unions stand to gain significantly from the ability to capture massive amounts of Medicaid funds under the BBBA.

**THE LEGALITY OF DEDUCTING UNION DUES FROM MEDICAID PAYMENTS**

Another factor with the potential to dramatically affect the ability of unions to access HCBS funds involves the interpretation of a longstanding federal Medicaid statute. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) provides that, with certain enumerated exceptions, “no payment” for Medicaid services be made to “anyone other than... the person or institution providing such care or service.”

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68 For more detailed discussions of this issue, see:
Nevertheless, since SEIU unionized California’s IHSS caregivers in the 1990s, states that have allowed for the unionization of their workforce of HCBS caregivers have also deducted union dues directly from the Medicaid payments made to these caregivers and forwarded the funds to the applicable unions. Effectively, these states are making Medicaid payments to third parties who provide no services to Medicaid beneficiaries in direct violation of federal law.

While *Harris v. Quinn* at least gave home care aides the right to refrain from authorizing such deductions, unions and sympathetic state officials have implemented a variety of coercive practices and policies designed to make it easy for unions to sign people up for dues payments and very difficult for caregivers to opt out.

For instance, all eight states deducting union dues from Medicaid payments to caregivers allow for some union access to employee orientation or training programs for the purposes of soliciting membership. In Washington, caregivers must participate in two captive-audience sessions as part of their onboarding process and once a year thereafter as part of their continuing education.

While dues deductions can be authorized via multiple means — in writing, electronically, telephonically, etc. — and at any time, unions often insist that dues cancellations be submitted in writing during arbitrary annual escape periods as short as a few days.

Worst of all, unions in Washington, California and Minnesota have all faced legal actions by a growing number of caregivers whose signatures were forged by union organizers on membership forms.\(^9\)

All of these coercive practices are enabled by states’ role as the dues-collector for unions. If dues were not collected via payroll deduction, home care aides could still pay union dues if they wish but would have to make their own payment arrangements with the union, giving them far greater control over their membership in the process.

Unfortunately, the federal law requiring caregivers to be paid directly and in full for their services has yet to be meaningfully enforced.

During the Obama administration, HHS chastised Washington state for withholding dues from caregivers’ Medicaid payments but did nothing to enforce the law. Instead, despite admitting that federal law does not provide for “exceptions to the direct payment principle,” it tried to give the practice legal cover via adoption of an administrative regulation in 2014 allowing states to make deductions from Medicaid payments for “benefits customary for employees,” arguably including union dues.

The Trump administration, recognizing the regulation contradicted the statutory direct payment requirement, repealed it but was unable to take any enforcement action to bring states into compliance before President Biden’s inauguration. Under Biden’s secretary Xavier Becerra, HHS recently proposed to reinstate the Obama-era regulation purporting to authorize the deductions.

If the statute is ultimately interpreted to prohibit such deductions, it would help ensure that both currently unionized caregivers and any unionized as a result of the BBBA have a meaningful choice about whether to sign up for union membership and pay union dues. If, however, states and unions are allowed to continue coercively seizing dues from caregivers’ Medicaid payments, many thousands will find themselves paying dues to this private special interest against their will.

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**Political influence of unions representing HCBS caregivers**

The unions that currently represent HCBS caregivers in eight states tend to be exceptionally active politically, a result of exploitative practices and limited representational obligations.\(^{70}\)

In the context of HCBS, there are no workplaces in the traditional sense. Caregivers work in their clients’ homes which, often, are also their own. Consequently, there are no workplace issues for a union to mediate or resolve. For example, there is simply no mechanism for a caregiver serving their adult child to file a grievance against that child for the conditions in the caregivers’ home. Further, the topics subject to bargaining are typically far more limited than in the private sector or even in the case of traditional public employees like teachers. In *Harris*, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that HCBS caregivers occupy an “unusual status” and that, as a result, the “powers and duties” of the unions representing them are “sharply circumscribed.”\(^{71}\)

Finally, the number of contracts the union must negotiate is typically limited. In Washington state, SEIU 775 negotiates a single collective bargaining agreement with the state once every two years on behalf of the state’s roughly 45,000 caregivers, an on-and-off process that generally lasts a few months. For this limited service, the union collects $44 million in revenue per year.\(^{72}\)

By way of comparison, the Washington Education Association — the state’s largest union — represents nearly 100,000 teachers and public-school employees, negotiates hundreds of collective bargaining agreements with school districts around the state, and provides traditional workplace representation services. Its annual revenue is about the same as SEIU 775’s.\(^{73}\)

The union generates its revenue via an exceptionally high dues rate — 3.2 percent of caregivers’ gross wages.\(^{74}\) The average caregiver pays nearly $900 per year in dues.\(^{75}\) State employees, by contrast, are generally employed full-time, amply compensated, and receive a higher level of traditional workplace representation, but pay only 1.5 percent of their gross wages in dues, averaging $850 per member per year.\(^{76}\)

What SEIU 775 doesn’t spend representing caregivers, it spends on politics. For years, the union has estimated that 40 percent or more of the dues members pay — which are divided among SEIU 775, the SEIU Washington State Council and the SEIU headquarters in Washington, D.C. — goes to support

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\(^{73}\) *See Part I, Line 12 of the Washington Education Association’s Form 990 tax return filed with the Internal Revenue Service for FY 2019.* Available online at: https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/910460665_201908_9900_2020120217462374.pdf

\(^{74}\) *See Item 21 of SEIU 775’s Form LM-2 for 2020.* Available online at: https://olmsapps.dol.gov/query/orgReport.do?rptId=747518&rptForm=LM2Form


activities unrelated to workplace representation.77 In 2020, SEIU 775 reported spending $2.8 million on “political activities and lobbying.”78

Indeed, HCBS Medicaid funds have made SEIU 775 arguably the preeminent political force in Washington state79 — surpassing even the teachers’ union, which has twice as many members.

**CONCLUSION**

Caregivers who serve Medicaid-eligible adults with functional disabilities work difficult jobs and provide an important service. Further, the demand for in-home care is growing as the population ages. However, even if Congress determines that additional funding for HCBS is warranted in principle and can develop a fiscally responsible method to pay for the added cost without harming the nation’s fragile and slowing economy, there is simply no excuse for sending billions of dollars in Medicaid funds to one of the nation’s largest and most politically aggressive special interest groups.

Congress should not let labor unions hide behind the elderly and persons with disabilities while rigging Medicaid for their own enrichment. To prevent this from happening, any additional HCBS funding made available to states should come without strings attached and leave states free to experiment and develop programs that make sense, instead of using federal funds to incentivize a union-centric model that harms caregivers and Medicaid clients and wastes taxpayer dollars.

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